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Abstract 
 Audit fees change year to year based off of fee models audit firms implement, and a large 
factor is the auditor effort and assumed liability of taking on a client. As the Big Four and Non-
Big Four firms take on clients, the audit fees fluctuate year to year as internal controls are 
deemed to be effective or not effective. Utilizing audit fee data from 2014-2016, this paper 
analyzes audit fees considering (1) whether or not firms have effective internal controls and (2) 
whether or not the firm is audited by a Big Four audit firm. Results indicate there was a trend of 
increased audit fees when internal controls were found to be not effective. The observed changes 
in audit fees that were found provide evidence of an indirect relationship to auditor liability. 
Audit fees for Big Four were nearly double when internal controls were not effective. Non-Big 
Four data had variation due to smaller sample sizes. Auditor liability is the risk of litigation from 
shareholders for giving incorrect audit opinions on an auditee’s audit. The Big Four audit 98 
percent of global market capitalization (Franzel, 2013), so they take on more risk than Non-Big 
Four firms and the risk needs to be offset by an increase in audit fees/premium. This is a method 
of managing their exposure to liability. Since more audit effort is put forth in engagements where 
there is litigation risk/auditor liability the increase in fees can be seen as an improvement in 
quality of audits due to increased audit effort. It is in the best interest of an audit firm to avoid 
litigation from shareholders, because the damage to market value and reputation can cause 
irreparable damage. The results from 2014 to 2016 are meant to provide an update to the effects 
of SOX on audit fees and the connection to auditor liability. This data should provide further 
evidence of the continuous effects of SOX. 
Introduction 
Following implementation of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), there have been 
businesses leaving the Big Four accounting firms due to the expense of pricier audits. The Big 
Four consist of E&Y, KPMG, PWC, and Deloitte. The moves from large to small audit firms can 
potentially be a concern, because smaller firms may not have the expertise for publically traded 
clients. SOX has affected many areas of audit engagements and more specifically, audit pricing. 
The audit environment is constantly changing and audit fees are a measurable value that relates 
indirectly to auditor liability. As auditor liability increases then audit fees tend to increase. 
Auditors are required to adhere to stricter standards post-SOX, so there is risk assumed when 
auditing clients. The more risk a client poses to an auditor the higher the audit fees. This paper 
provides a brief literature review of how SOX affects audit fees, then focuses on more recent 
changes in audit fees from 2014 to 2016. The observed changes in audit fees that were found 
from data gathered from Audit Analytics can then provide insight into the indirect relationship to 
auditor liability. If a material weakness is found, then internal controls are deemed not effective. 
This study focuses on whether internal controls are effective. The main assumption is that 
sections from SOX, primarily the testing of internal control and their effectiveness, determine 
auditor fees based off of the auditor liability assumed from auditing clients with effective or not 
effective internal controls. Effective internal controls mean there are no material weaknesses in 
the ICFR of the audited company. ICFR stands for internal control financial report. Companies 
have to have an ICFR audit if they are accelerated filers, which is determined by their market 
value. Market value has to be at least $75,000,000. A material weakness varies depending upon 
the client and the industry. If internal controls are effective, then audit fees are expected to be 
priced at a discount. If internal controls are not effective, then audit fees are expected to be 
priced at a premium to offset auditor liability.  
Sections of SOX that affect Audit Fees 
 The predominate sections of SOX that affect audit engagements are 101, 103, 202, 204, 
401, 404. Section 101 created the PCAOB to regulate the public accounting industry. Greater 
oversight of the accounting profession suggests that auditors are more likely to be diligent in 
their audit work. Audit effort is expected to increase as auditors spend more time conducting 
their audits (Ghosh & Pawlewicz, 2009). Section 103 requires that audit ﬁrms retain audit work 
papers for seven years, provide a second partner review of the audit report, and describe the 
extent of testing of the internal controls of the company (Ghosh & Pawlewicz, 2009). Sections 
202 and 204 require audit committee preapproval for services provided by the external auditor, 
and greater communication between the auditor and audit committee. Preapproval and increased 
communication require greater audit work (Ghosh & Pawlewicz, 2009). Section 401 introduces 
new rules regarding reporting for off-balance-sheet transactions, pro forma ﬁnancial reporting, 
and special-purpose entities. These disclosures are expected to increase the effort to audit 
ﬁnancial statements (Ghosh & Pawlewicz, 2009). The section that correlates to the data of this 
study is section 404, which requires the audit ﬁrm to attest to the client’s management 
assessment of internal controls as part of the audit engagement (Ghosh & Pawlewicz, 2009). 
Auditee management has a larger role in internal controls since the enactment of SOX, so 
managerial ability has more effect on audit fees because they are obligated to have more active 
roles in financial reporting (Yutao & Yan, 2017). Managers regulate the internal controls within 
a company by making sure policies and procedures are followed. These listed sections of SOX 
require more audit effort post-SOX for financial statement audits, which increases audit fees.  
Fee Models 
 Audit firms price audits based off of different factors that are involved in an engagement. 
The three things that were found to affect how auditors price are the estimated effort to perform 
the audit, the rank of personnel required to execute the audit, and the audit ﬁrm’s perceived risk 
and rewards (Dickins et al., 2008). Dickins et al. derived these steps based on interviews with 
practicing auditors. Steps one and two, estimated audit effort and rank of personnel required, are 
the prime factors that determine how managers price audit fees on an account-by-account 
analysis of a client’s financial statements (Dickins et al., 2008). It was found that audit fees 
increased by $400,000 in 2001 to $900,000 in 2005. This increase suggests that there have been 
systematic changes in how audits are priced and that additional audit effort is required due to 
SOX. Through Dickins et al. study, it was found that audit fees increase when there is poorly 
trained staff at the client’s company and decrease when there are well-managed internal controls 
(2008). The fee model will continue to evolve as new laws and regulations are developed.  
Low-balling/Discounts and Premiums 
 Low-balling is a phrase used when a firm creates a discount for some advantage. The 
issue with this practice is the belief that it impairs independence. If a firm is willing to sacrifice 
revenues for the sake of more clients, they may overlook material issues as well to keep clients. 
In one study it was found that discounting from Big Four firms for initial audit engagements was 
priced conservatively in 2006 (Huang et al., 2009). This means discounts were not a noticeable 
trend for 2006 for Big Four firms. A more recent study during the periods of 2007 through 2010 
found the Big Four firms discounted their initial-year audit fees that ranged from 16 to 34 
percent (Desir et al., 2014). Findings like these show how audit pricing was determined with an 
overarching goal of maintaining clients for long-term goals.  
 Another study found that Big Four audit firms ceased discounts post-SOX. In 2001, they 
granted 24 percent discounts on average to initial audit engagements but from 2005 to 2006 they 
increased audit fees by 16 percent. It was also found that the Big 4 are less likely to serve as 
successors after an audit change. These findings suggest that the Big 4 are conservative in their 
pricing decisions and client acceptance (Huang et al., 2009). The Big 4 could be less likely to 
serve as successors due to risk re-alignment or clients wanting lower audit fees.  
 Risk premiums increase audit fees, which is a factor that is difficult to avoid in certain 
industries. According to Dickins et al., all variables that cause discounts or premiums need to be 
avoided or controlled so audit fees are fair (2008). The assumption that audit fee premiums and 
discounts should be avoided has merit. It seems reasonable to have a premium when it comes to 
not effective internal controls. It is the auditor’s right to adjust for risk. 
Internal Control Weaknesses  
 A study was conducted that determined whether internal controls affected audit fees more 
post-SOX than pre-SOX. This study may show how auditor liability and the way they assess 
internal controls post-SOX are related. Clients with higher risk due to their personal losses, 
which also may affect their internal controls, will only increase the legal liability of audit firms 
post-SOX (Choi et al., 2010). From this study it was determined that companies with inefficient 
internal controls correlated with higher audit fees and those with well-managed internal controls 
had lower audit fees from 2003 to 2004, but pre-SOX there was no correlation between audit 
fees and internal controls from 2000 to 2002 (Choi et al., 2010).  Choi et al. found that audit fees 
are higher across the board post-SOX for all firms due to increased audit effort or auditor’s legal 
liabilities (2010). This suggests that fees are indirectly related to an increase in auditor liability. 
The increasing audit fees since the enactment of SOX is evidence of increasing liability.  When 
internal controls were found to be effective post-SOX there were still increases in audit fees 
(Choi et al., 2010). Auditors are having to comply with stricter standards, so there is more 
pressure post-SOX to conduct a thorough audit. Firms do not want to be in the same situation as 
Arthur Anderson. Arthur Anderson dissolved after the Enron scandal due to suspicions of fraud 
in their dealings with Enron. Another study found information technology improves internal 
controls, which has a positive impact of reducing auditor fees, so there is an indirect relationship 
between information technology and audit fees (Chen et al., 2014). The relationship between 
internal controls and audit fees has been demonstrated to be inverse. Effective internal controls 
help reduce audit effort and makes the process of an attest engagement more efficient when there 
is less tests that need completed when it is found internal controls are effective. Another study 
found that post-SOX firms that found material weaknesses in an audit client were found to have 
audit fee premiums. Audit clients who remediated their internal controls were found to have 
decreasing audit fees, but an audit fee premium would still linger compared to audit clients who 
never had material weaknesses (Munsif et al., 2011). These findings suggest that audit fees tend 
to be “sticky” for audit clients with material weaknesses in internal controls. This lingering fee 
can be viewed as a risk premium to auditors who disclosed an internal control problem in the 
past for the audit clients (Munsif et al., 2011). Ineffective internal controls increase auditor risk, 
which increases audit fees. It would be interesting to see a future study that measures how long 
these “sticky” audit fees stay with an auditee. The data obtained from Audit Analytics fails to 
measure the “sticky” audit fees, but there is still merit in the findings.  
 
Auditor Liability 
 “The potential legal liability of an auditee and auditor to financial statement users drives 
the design of external financial reporting systems… the benefits are in the nature of liability 
avoidance” (Simunic, 1980, p. 162). Simunic talked about the relationship between auditor 
liability and the way reporting systems are designed. Reporting systems are the same thing as 
internal controls set up by clients for financial reporting. It has been stated by Choi et al. that 
internal controls have a relationship with audit fees, depending on whether they are effective or 
not effective (2010). “The auditor’s expected share of residual liability losses seems to increase 
only with evidence of significant deterioration in the auditee’s operation” (Simunic, 1980, p. 
187). The less efficient operation/internal controls, then the higher the auditor liability. Ghosh & 
Pawlewicz (2009) examine whether the increased audit effort, expected auditor legal liability, 
and fees are all correlated due to SOX. They drew a sample from 2000 to 2005 and found an 
increase in audit fees by 74 percent and found audit fee increases are larger for Big Four firms 
post-SOX (Ghosh & Pawlewicz, 2009). A study done by Frantz et al. found the market place 
interprets litigation against audit firms as a signal of decreased audit quality and when restricted 
to firms within the same industries, the response is more negative (1998). It is in the best interest 
of an audit firm to avoid litigation, because the damage to market value and reputation can cause 
irreparable damage. For example, Arthur Anderson dissolved after the revelation of the Enron 
scandal that helped set up the creation of SOX. The Big Four firms audit the majority of 
publically traded companies, and with such a large market there is litigation against the firms 
every year. Litigation is something to be avoided, but the negative effect of litigation also 
decreases over time as the frequency of non-meritorious lawsuits increases over time (Frantz et 
al., 1998). 
Sample Selection  
The variables taken from Audit Analytics were audit fees, auditor f-key, IC was effective, 
fiscal year IC opinion, matchfy balsh total assets, and name Audit fees are the amount audit firms 
charged a company for auditing their financials. Auditor f-key is a list of audit firms than can be 
filtered to find the desired firms. IC was effective was a yes or no answer on whether the ICFR 
audit was effective or not. Fiscal year of IC opinion was the year an opinion was given on the 
ICFR audit. Matchfy balsh total assets stands for match fiscal year balance sheet total assets and 
it was the total assets of the company being audited. Name is referring to the names of the 
audited companies.  
The sample sizes were narrowed down from Audit Analytics by eliminating blank rows 
with no audit fees and total assets. One issue in the data was some auditees only had audit fees 
given for a single period and not all three periods tested from 2014 to 2016. The reason for the 
low number of samples in Table 3 are due to the fact that not all companies have to have an audit 
on their internal control financial report (ICFR). To qualify for an ICFR audit the company has 
to be an accelerated filer with $75,000,000 in market capitalization.  
 This study separates the data into two different categories. The Big Four: E&Y, KPMG, 
PWC, and Deloitte have their data compiled because they audit more than 98 percent of the 
global market capitalization of U.S. issuers (Franzel, 2013). The other half is labeled Non-Big 
Four, which includes every other accounting firm conducting audits. A potential weakness in the 
data in the Non-Big Four data is that there are different tiers of firms after the Big Four, but this 
study does not take in to account those tiers as separate categories.  
The data is split between the different asset ranges, which show increases in audit fees as 
total assets rises. Table 1 through Table 4 each have bold columns, which means they are not 
effective internal controls. The columns to the left of the bolded columns were effective internal 
controls. All tables reflect data in median values. The mean values had an excess amount of 
variation, so median values were able to present data with merit.  
Table 1 
 Table 1 below shows Big Four effective internal control vs not effective internal control. 
The median values found that audit fees increased as asset ranges increased and there was a 
connection between internal control effectiveness and audit fees. The bolded columns represent 
not effective internal control and the data year to year shows that audit fees are higher compared 
to the columns to the left of the bolded columns, which are effective internal controls.     
 
Table 1: Big Four Effective IC vs Not Effective IC 
Median Audit Fees ($) 
Total Asset 
Ranges 
(billions $) 
2014 2015 2016 
n=1,857 
Effective 
ICFR 
n=136 
Not 
Effective 
ICFR 
n=1,816 
Effective 
ICFR 
n=118 
Not 
Effective 
ICFR 
n=1,657 
Effective 
ICFR 
n=100 
Not 
Effective 
ICFR 
Up to 1 819,769 1,214,000 861,315 1,653,000 940,555 1,380,750 
1-2 1,394,590 1,376,250 1,477,960 2,184,645 1,520,000 2,262,700 
2-3 1,655,000 1,857,320 1,938,000 2,503,000 2,042,970 3,028,750 
3-4 2,049,430 1,753,560 1,898,310 5,004,500 1,907,120 4,500,000 
4-5 2,000,000 2,914,210 2,392,050 3,335,960 2,104,500 4,486,000 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Table 2 below shows the median percent changes per year for Table 1. The data breaks 
down the audit increases or decreases and shows the high percentage increases in audit fees. 
With a few exceptions in the data the difference in increase of audit fees for not effective internal 
controls is more than double the effective internal control columns. This supports the indirect 
relationship that auditor liability effects audit fees when internal controls are not effective.  
 
Table 2: Big Four Audit Fee Percent Changes per Year 
Median % Changes per Year 
Total Asset 
Ranges 
(billions $) 
2014-2015 2015-2016 2014-2016 
Effective 
ICFR 
Not 
Effective 
ICFR 
Effective 
ICFR 
Not 
Effective 
ICFR 
Effective 
ICFR 
Not 
Effective 
ICFR 
Up to 1 5.07 34.68 9.20 (15.55) 14.73 13.74 
1-2 5.98 58.74 2.84 3.57 8.99 64.41 
2-3 17.10 34.76 5.42 21.00 23.44 63.07 
3-4 (7.37) 185.39 0.46 (10.08) (6.94) 156.62 
4-5 19.60 14.47 (12.02) 34.47 5.23 53.94 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Table 3 below has the same layout as Table 1, but it deals with Non-Big Four effective 
internal controls vs effective internal controls. The finding from Table 1 are not the same here in 
Table 3. There are no trends in data and there is missing data due to lower sample sizes. The 
variation may be due to many companies not filing an ICFR when narrowing down the sample 
by Non-Big Four firms. The sample sizes may be too small to produce accurate median audit 
fees that would demonstrate the same trends as Table 1.  
 
Table 3: Non-Big Four Effective IC vs Not Effective IC 
Median Audit Fees ($) 
Total Asset 
Ranges 
(billions $) 
2014 2015 2016 
n=615 
Effective 
ICFR 
n=48 
Not 
Effective 
ICFR 
n=633 
Effective 
ICFR 
n=56 
Not 
Effective 
ICFR 
n=588 
Effective 
ICFR 
n=56 
Not 
Effective 
ICFR 
Up to 1 378,600 429,598 405,841 546,741 436,609 515,848 
1-2 273,133 2,100,610 285,600 1,731,000 313,529 1,559,000 
2-3 446,763 1,455,820 422,171 1,136,195 412,715 939,060 
3-4 469,250 2,449,745 466,000 Na 504,200 Na 
4-5 543,000 3,638,500 588,725 2,924,870 437,057 1,093,180 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Table 4 below shows the median percent changes year to year for Non-Big Four firms. 
The variation in the data is due to the same problems listed as Table 3 above. This data could be 
improved by narrowing down samples to just companies who have data present for all three 
years and by finding more companies to put in the data set, but this study was limited due to time 
constraints.  
 
Table 4: Non-Big Four Audit Fee Percent Changes per Year 
Median % Changes per Year 
Total Asset 
Ranges (billions $) 
2014-2015 2015-2016 2014-2016 
Effective 
ICFR 
Not 
Effective 
ICFR 
Effective 
ICFR 
Not 
Effective 
ICFR 
Effective 
ICFR 
Not 
Effective 
ICFR 
Up to 1 7.20 27.27 7.58 (5.65) 15.32 20.08 
1-2 4.56 (17.60) 9.78 (9.94) 14.79 (25.78) 
2-3 (5.50) (21.95) (2.24) (17.35) (7.62) (35.50) 
3-4 (0.69) Na 8.20 Na 7.45 Na 
4-5 8.42 (19.61) (25.76) (62.62) (19.51) (69.96) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 The observed changes in audit fees that were found in predominately in Table 1 and 
Table 2 provides evidence of an indirect relationship to auditor liability. Effective internal 
controls mean there are no material weaknesses in the financials of an audited company. A 
material weakness varies depending upon the client and the industry. If a material weakness is 
found, then internal controls are deemed not effective. This study focuses on whether internal 
controls are effective when compiling data from Audit Analytics. The main assumption is that 
sections from SOX, primarily the testing of internal control and their effectiveness, influence 
auditor fees based off of the auditor liability assumed from auditing clients with effective or not 
effective internal controls. If internal controls are effective, then audit fees are expected to be 
priced at a discount. If internal controls are not effective, then audit fees are expected to be 
priced at a premium to offset auditor liability. By comparing audit fees by effective internal 
controls vs. not effective internal controls for the Big Four and Non-Big Four firms, there was a 
trend of increased audit fees as internal controls were found to be not effective. Increased audit 
fees can be indirectly related to auditor liability. The more risk associated with an audit means 
firms will protect their interests and increase the benefit of completing the engagement by 
applying an audit fee premium. More audit effort is being put forth than before SOX for the last 
sixteen years. Auditor liability has increased since SOX was enacted, because of the noticeable 
rise in audit fees. When internal controls were found to be effective post-SOX there were still 
increases in audit fees (Choi et al., 2010). Auditors are having to comply with stricter standards, 
so there is more pressure post-SOX to conduct a thorough audit.  
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